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Developing Valid Behavioural Indicators of Animal Pain 
 
Abstract:  
 
Identifying which non-human animal species are capable of feeling pain is important both 
for understanding pain mechanisms more generally, and for informing animal welfare 
regulations, particularly in genera that are not yet widely protected. A common way to try 
to provide evidence of pain experiences is through behavioural indicators. In this paper I use 
a very simple interventionist approach to experimentation, and the contrast case provided 
by C. elegans, to argue that behavioural indicators commonly used for identifying pain in 
non-human animals are much less robust than typically presented. Indeed, I argue that 
many behavioural indicators of pain are invalid as they are currently described. More 
positively, this analysis makes it possible to identify what valid criteria might look like, and 
where relevant, identify existing evidence related to them. Based on this I propose that the 
best way to make progress on questions around animal pain is to clearly ally them with 
questions about animal consciousness more generally, and to productively use conceptual 
and empirical work in both areas to develop more theoretically defensible behavioural 
indicators.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Like many philosophers, I am open to the possibility of consciousness (including pain 
experiences) being widespread across the animal kingdom1. Much of the evidence levered 
in favour of consciousness in the more ‘controversial’ genera across fish, crustaceans and 
insects, outlining their behavioural and neurophysiological complexity, seems strongly 
suggestive at the least (e.g. Barron & Klein, 2016; Elwood, 2019; Sneddon, 2013; Sneddon et 
al., 2014). However, in this paper I use a simple interventionist approach to 
experimentation, and the contrast case provided by C. elegans, to argue that behavioural 
criteria for identifying non-human animal pain are much less robust than typically 
presented. Indeed, I argue that many behavioural indicators of pain are invalid as they are 
currently described. This is not intended to undermine existing claims about pain 
experiences in these genera, but is part of an attempt to evaluate what valid criteria might 
look like, and where relevant identify existing evidence related to them. Overall, I propose 
that the best way to make progress on questions around animal pain is to clearly ally them 
with questions about animal consciousness more generally, and to productively use 
conceptual and empirical work in both areas to develop more theoretically defensible 
behavioural indicators. Getting this right is important both for understanding pain 
mechanisms more generally, and in informing animal welfare regulations, particularly in 
genera that are not yet widely protected. 
 
 
1 Though see e.g. Carruthers, this volume, on whether this claim is meaningful. 
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There has so far not been much systematic philosophical engagement with behavioural 
criteria used to identify non-human animal pain experiences, particularly as applied to the 
more controversial genera. One possible reason for this is that challenges to claims about 
animal pain are usually associated with the no-cortex-no-consciousness challenge, made 
very prominently by Key (2016; see also e.g. Rose et al., 2014). As the name suggests, the 
challenge stems from the claim that cortical brain areas are necessary for consciousness, 
and since they are not present in the more controversial genera, they are incapable of pain 
experiences. So far, relatively few find the no-cortex-no-consciousness challenge persuasive, 
with replies either suggesting that cortical areas may not be required for consciousness in 
humans, and/or that it is an open question what sort of brain structures might support 
consciousness in other species (see e.g. responses to Key by Damasio & Damasio, 2016; 
Edelman, 2016; Merker, 2016; Seth, 2016). One possibility is that since the no-cortex-no-
consciousness challenge is not deemed to be persuasive, allied critiques of behavioural 
indicators are too. However, as I argue below, there are legitimate and fairly serious 
concerns to be raised about them. 
 
In what follows I use a simple interventionist approach to experimentation for assessing the 
validity of behavioural indicators of pain experiences (Craver, 2007; Kästner & Andersen, 
2018; Woodward, 2003). Roughly, this works as follows. To investigate a target (e.g. 
putative pain experiences) one must be able to reliably causally intervene on it, and for it to 
have specific and observable causal effects. If an experimental paradigm does not 
successfully intervene on the target state, and/or if the wrong set of causal effects are 
observed, then any measurements based on these are not valid. The relationship between 
nociception, which refers to the non-conscious sensory processing of aversive stimuli, and 
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conscious pain experiences, is sufficiently complex for this to be a useful framework to 
structure the discussion.  
 
I also make a possibly controversial assumption: that the nematode C. elegans is not 
conscious and does not have pain experiences. This may simply be question begging, and 
the evidence presented here may instead persuade some that C. elegans is a strong 
contender in the consciousness stakes. However, I take this assumption to be reasonably 
defensible. While consciousness is unlikely to be determined by how many neurons a 
species has in any straightforward way, C. elegans is rather at the low end of the scale with 
302, and (arguably) little in the way of centralized information processing. Instead, C. 
elegans shows how an organism can display remarkable behavioural complexity with very 
little in the way of a complex central nervous system. This is one of the reasons why it 
continues to be used widely as a model organism in biology (for an overview of C. elegans, 
see e.g. Corsi et al., 2015). In this way it provides a useful contrast case between, on the one 
hand, the sometimes surprising behaviours that are plausibly driven by nociceptive 
processing and simple forms of non-conscious learning alone, and on the other, behaviours 
unique to pain experiences.  
 
In what follows I apply this basic interventionist framework, and the contrast case of C. 
elegans, to the list of criteria for identifying pain experiences in the more controversial 
genera from Sneddon et al. (2014), which I take to be representative of the basic principles 
of reasoning used across much of this literature. Combined, these approaches show that 
many behavioural indicators of pain are invalid as they are currently described. Instead, I 
argue that where they are valid or can be made so, it is because of their relationship to 
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plausible theoretical claims about the features of consciousness in general. That is, valid 
behavioural indicators of pain are so in virtue of referring to capacities for performing 
complex forms of learning and/or complex decision making associated with consciousness. 
While highlighting the significant methodological challenges in pain research, I suggest 
throughout how existing indicators could be developed to be more theoretically robust, and 
identify evidence relevant to these. This shows that there are still good reasons to think that 
pain experiences are widespread across the animal kingdom. 
 
A note: This paper is officially neutral about whether pain (vs nociception) is always 
conscious. I am primarily interested though in pain that is conscious. I therefore typically 
refer to ‘pain experiences’ to make that clear in the discussion below. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 I outline a very basic interventionist approach to 
experimentation and use this to differentiate between valid and reliable behavioural 
indicators of nociception and pain. In Section 3 I present the principles and criteria used to 
identify pain experiences from Sneddon et al. (2014), which I take to be fairly representative 
of those used in this literature. In Section 4 I analyse the validity of behavioural indicators of 
pain experiences, making recommendations about their development where relevant. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Interventionism, nociception and pain 
 
An interventionist approach to experimentation is a structured way of understanding causal 
relationships between experimental interventions, target states, and observed effects (Corsi 
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et al., 2015). In order for observed effects (e.g. animal behaviour) to be valid indicators of a 
target state (e.g. pain experiences), at least two things must obtain. First, the experimental 
intervention must have a causal effect on the target state. Second, the observed effects 
must be produced by a change in the target state. There are many more relevant criteria 
but these are the bare essentials, and are sufficient for this discussion (for more, see e.g. 
Craver, 2007; Kästner & Andersen, 2018; Woodward, 2003).  
 
Figure 1 compares the causal structures of nociception and pain. Nociception (Figure 1a) 
refers to the non-conscious process of sensing and responding to (potentially) harmful 
stimuli. Nociceptors are nerve cells that are often sensitive to a range of noxious stimuli 
(chemical, heat, pressure, etc). Nociceptive signals are sent from these peripheral nerve 
cells to the spinal cord, into (in mammals) subcortical and cortical brain areas. Nociception 
can trigger behavioural responses like the withdrawal reflex, but (as outlined below) more 
complex responses too2. In organisms capable of consciousness, nociceptive activity above 
particular thresholds often causes conscious pain experiences (Figure 1b). Plausibly, these 
pain experiences generate a different suite of behavioural responses to nociception alone 
(e.g. typically more long-term and flexible behaviours). There are of course exceptions to 
this. Some pain experiences are not caused by nociception (e.g. in chronic pain conditions), 
and some nociceptive activity does not cause pain experiences (e.g. if it is strongly 
modulated top-down). However, in the fairly simple experimental paradigms used in this 
literature, it is, I think, safe to assume that this captures the most relevant parts of the 
causal structure. 
 
2 I describe here how nociception is understood to work in mammals. Nociception may be realized differently 
across genera, or potentially in artificial systems. 
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Figure 1 
 
a)                                                                           b)
  
                                               
 
 
 
Hopefully it is obvious that the way to tell whether an organism is capable of having pain 
experiences is to see if one can elicit behavioural responses that are unique to pain 
experiences. The easiest way to do this is to experimentally intervene directly on 
nociceptive processing, for example by exposing an organism to noxious stimuli which 
trigger nociception. If these interventions generate behavioural responses unique to pain 
experiences, then pain experiences are present, and the causal structure is as in Figure 1b). 
If only nociceptive responses are generated, then pain experiences are (probably) not, and 
the causal structure is as in Figure 1a). The obvious difficulty is in identifying which 
responses are purely nociceptive, and which are related to pain. There are broadly speaking 
two ways to do this. 
 
One way to select behavioural indicators of pain experiences is to look at what markers of 
pain are used in e.g. mammals and birds, where we are fairly confident that pain 
experiences are present, and to transfer these across to more controversial genera. If a 
marker provides evidence of pain in mammals, then finding it in these genera should do too. 
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Something like this reasoning seems to inform the inclusion of a range of the criteria used in 
this literature (see e.g. introduction of Ashley et al. 2009).  
 
On the face of it, this sounds safe, but there is a significant hazard here. This is that markers 
of pain in mammals are not widely used to show that mammals are capable of having pain 
experiences. It is fairly widely accepted that they are. Instead, markers of pain experiences 
are often used in experimental settings to track the presence or absence of pain, or track 
levels of pain, for example to investigate responses to particular kinds of noxious stimuli or 
injury, or to monitor animal welfare. That is, it is assumed that mammals are capable of pain 
experiences, and what is needed is a way of tracking when they are in pain. In mammals 
though, tracking purely nociceptive responses might be a perfectly reliable way of doing 
this. To explain: if one can assume that there is a strong correlation between levels of 
nociceptive activity and levels of pain (which might be a safe assumption for certain 
experimental contexts in certain species) then tracking nociceptive responses is a reliable 
way of tracking pain experiences.  
 
This can be illustrated through the rat grimace scale (Sotocina et al., 2011; Waite et al., 
2015). This is now fairly routinely used to track pain experiences in laboratory rats and uses 
changes in the shape of eyes, whiskers, nose and cheeks, among others, to score the 
intensity of pain experiences. This rating scale was based on the use of similar scales to 
score pain experiences in humans unable to verbally report (Lints-Martindale et al., 2007) 
and on the assumption that facial expressions related to emotional states are widely 
conserved across mammals. It is also based on the assumption that rats feel pain. While 
changes in whisker and eye shape are likely reliable ways of tracking the intensity of pain 
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experiences, by themselves are very poor evidence that rats are capable of pain 
experiences, as they are generated in a reflex-like manner. Reflexive responses are generally 
associated with nociceptive and so are deemed to be poor indicators of the capacity for 
pain. In this case, attempting to use a marker like this in controversial species to show that 
they are capable of pain would be to misuse it. One has to be fairly careful therefore in 
simply transferring behavioural indicators across from mammals: while they might very 
reliably signal the presence of pain experiences in mammals, they are often not valid ways 
of showing that an animal is capable of pain experiences at all.  
 
A more direct way of identifying appropriate behavioural markers of pain is to therefore do 
some theoretical work, and as above, identify behavioural responses that are likely to be 
unique to pain experiences. This is hard: there is no general agreement on a fine-grained 
functional description of pain experiences. This is hardly surprising given that there is no 
general agreement on a fine-grained functional description of consciousness in general. 
Similarly, there is not, as far as I know, a widely agreed description of the limits of 
nociception: this too is still work in progress. Nevertheless, researchers working on animal 
pain often use a theoretical framework that they argue has the power to identify valid 
markers of pain experiences, discussed below.  
 
3: A definition, two principles and a set of criteria 
 
In this paper I treat Sneddon et al. (2014) as presenting a fairly representative view of the 
general principles used in research on pain experiences in controversial genera (i.e. anything 
outside mammals and birds). Here, the central definition of pain, based on its likely 
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function, is (from Sneddon, 2009) to allow animals to: “quickly learn to avoid the noxious 
stimulus and demonstrate sustained changes in behaviour that have a protective function to 
reduce further injury and pain, prevent the injury from recurring, and promote healing and 
recovery” (p. 338). From this, two principles are used to generate a set of criteria. One 
principle is that there is a ‘whole animal’ physiological or behavioural response to 
potentially painful stimulation. This is to rule out local bodily responses generated by 
nociceptive processing only (like withdrawal reflexes of individual limbs), and includes both 
short and long term responses. The second key principle is that there is a change in 
motivation in the animal. This includes immediate changes in the things that the animal is 
motivated to do, as well as longer-lasting changes in behaviour driven by learning. These 
principles are then used to identify more specific criteria that can be used in experimental 
designs to try to identify pain experiences.  
 
The assumed function of pain that this definition and these principles are based on is that it 
enables individuals to avoid similar painful stimuli and to promote healing in the long-term. 
In contrast, nociception is typically presented as having only local and short-term 
behavioural effects such as withdrawal reflexes. However, nociception also drives non-local 
and longer-term behaviours, and can be used for simple forms of avoidance learning. In C. 
elegans, nociception causes a stereotypical withdrawal reflex away from noxious stimuli, 
but also simple whole body movements locomoting forwards, again away from noxious 
stimuli (Mohammadi et al., 2013). Nociception can also generate longer-term behaviours. 
When stimulated multiple times, the sensitivity of nociceptors increases, such that lower 
levels of stimulation are subsequently required to activate them and drive nociceptive 
responses. Of more interest, nociceptors also increase their sensitivity at sites of injury and 
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inflammation. This means that at injured sites, stimulation that would not usually cause 
withdrawal reflexes and other nociception responses now does: in effect this helps the 
organism to avoid further damaging an injured/inflamed bodily site. In addition, nociceptive 
processing fed to the spinal cord only can support simple but efficient forms of avoidance 
learning in rats (Grau et al., 2006), which enables learning to avoid noxious stimulation. In 
this case, on at least an uncharitable reading of the definition of pain give above, mere 
nociception fits the bill. Nociception alone can support forms of avoidance learning that 
enable organisms to avoid similar painful stimuli, and can drive behaviours that promote 
healing and recovery. 
 
This is a fairly uncharitable reading of the definition of pain though: in using the definition 
one is supposed to rule out behaviours that are likely just simple nociceptive reflexes. 
However, as raised by Rose et al. (2014), it is not always entirely clear what these include. 
Presumably the forwards locomotion of C. elegans away from noxious stimuli does not 
count as a ‘simple’ reflex: it is a whole animal response, which requires a fair degree of 
motor co-ordination. Yet it is (plausibly) a nociceptive reflex, but an example of a complex 
one. Some reflexes require more co-ordination of muscle groups than others: the Galant 
reflex in human newborns involves the whole trunk curving sideways in response to 
stimulation next to the spine. In this case we have to say rather more about the degree of 
complexity we should expect of nociceptive vs. pain-based responses. And indeed, the way 
that pain research is actually carried out, in terms of the experimental paradigms used and 
the variables measured, is often far richer than the definition and criteria suggest. This 
richness relies on implicit assumptions about what the relevant forms of complexity are. As 
recently argued by Birch (2020), one cannot make claims about animal sentience with no 
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theoretical commitments whatever. 
 
A common theme of these assumptions is that responses to painful experiences should 
exhibit features of ‘higher level’ cognition: decision making that is based on a range of 
integrated information, and flexible and long-lasting forms of learning. Unsurprisingly, these 
are taken to be markers of consciousness more generally (e.g. see discussion in Godfrey-
Smith, 2017). In what follows I claim that these capacities are key in evaluating the validity 
of behavioural indicators of pain, and that putting these front and centre makes it possible 
to identify a much more robust set of criteria, and related behavioural indicators, for 
identifying pain experiences. While these criteria are unlikely to convince die-hard sceptics, 
they are better theoretically motivated than existing ones, and rely on a deeper analysis of 
the interactions between nociception, cognitive capacities, and consciousness.  
 
To do this I analyse the list of criteria related to the principles from Sneddon et al. (2014) 
listed in Table 1, drawing on a simple interventionist approach to experimentation and the 
contrast case of C. elegans. After a brief explanation of each criteria, the analyses explore 
whether pain experiences are reliably targeted by the criteria (or whether the criteria more 
likely target nociception), and whether C. elegans, assumed to be incapable of pain 
experiences, nevertheless meets the criteria of pain experiences.  
 
It is also assumed throughout, with Sneddon et al. (2014), that convincing evidence of pain 
experiences requires multiple indicators, rather than a single measure. As Sneddon et al. 
explain, “together [these indicators] represent an increasing level of complexity of 
responses to pain that go beyond simple and acute detection and reflex responses and 
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begin to demonstrate a level of behavioural complexity that would require some form of 
experience” (p. 209, op cit). This fits very well with the idea that the (often implicit) 
theoretical assumptions that motivate particular criteria do indeed track the idea that it is 
‘behavioural complexity’ that is key to showing that an organism is capable of 
consciousness, and pain experiences in particular. 
 
Principle 1: Whole-animal responses to potentially 
painful events differ from innocuous stimulation 
Principle 2: Change in motivational behaviours after 
a potentially painful event 
Criteria: 
1. Possession of nociceptors, evidence of central 
processing of nociception involving areas that 
regulate motivated behaviour (including learning 
and fear) 
2. Nociceptive action responsive to endogenous 
modulators 
3. Nociception activates physiological responses 
linked to stress (e.g. changes in respiration, heart 
rate or hormonal levels) 
4. Evidence that responses are not just a nociceptive 
withdrawal reflex 
5. Long-term avoidance behaviour 
6. Protective behaviours such as wound guarding, 
limping, rubbing, licking or excessive grooming 
7. All of the above reduced by analgesia or local 
anaesthetics 
Criteria: 
8. Self-administration of analgesia 
9. Pay a cost to access analgesia 
10. Pay selective attention to response to the 
noxious stimulus over other normally salient stimuli; 
animal does not respond appropriately to 
competing events 
11. Conditioned place avoidance and long-lasting 
avoidance learning 
12. Relief learning 
13. Trade-offs between avoiding noxious stimuli and 
other motivational requirements  
14. Evidence of paying a cost to avoid the noxious 
stimulus 
 
 
Table 1. This is adapted (to get permission!) from Sneddon et al. (2014), Table 1. 
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4. The validity of behavioural indicators of pain 
 
4.1 Criteria related to first key principle: Whole animal responses that differ from innocuous 
stimulation 
 
As the first principle suggests, these criteria are related to showing that the animal does not 
only show local bodily nociceptive responses (e.g. limb-specific withdrawal reflexes), but 
that noxious stimulation has physical and behavioural effects on the whole animal. These 
are therefore not all purely behavioural indicators, though most of them are assessed via 
observed changes in behaviour. 
 
The first criterion related to this principle (Criterion 1 from Table 1 above) is that 
nociceptive signals are centrally processed, in areas that regulate learning and fear. In some 
ways this seems to presuppose that the animal is conscious: presumably fear is a conscious 
experience like pain, and centralized processing is often associated with the capacity for 
consciousness. If this is right, then this criterion assumes exactly what is under debate. On 
another interpretation however, the criterion just demands that nociceptive processing 
cannot be purely local within the central nervous system, and must be able to support some 
forms of learning. This though does not provide a valid indicator of the presence of pain 
experiences. As reviewed throughout this paper, nociceptive processing in C. elegans occurs 
‘centrally’, and supports learning. However, by assumption, C. elegans is not capable of pain 
experiences. So, while it is probably necessary that nociceptive signals are transmitted to 
‘central’ areas of the central nervous system, it is not itself a valid indicator.  
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Criterion 2, that nociceptive processing is sensitive to endogenous modulators, is an 
interesting one. Here the idea is that nociceptive processing can be affected by 
neurotransmitters produced within the central nervous system, which in turn affects 
behavioural responses. Opioids are generally a reliable way to modulate nociceptive 
processing across animal taxa, and morphine has behavioural effects on C. elegans (Nieto-
Fernandez et al., 2009). Nematodes administered with morphine show less avoidance 
behaviour than controls towards areas of noxiously high temperatures. As Mills et al. (2016) 
show, nociceptive processing in C. elegans is also modulated by endogenous (internally 
generated) opiates. That is, nociception in C. elegans satisfies this criterion. The widespread 
presence of endogenous antinociceptive systems across taxa is discussed in more depth 
later in this section. For now though, the simple contrast case provided by C. elegans shows 
that this criterion does not present a valid way of identifying pain experiences. 
 
The same is true for Criterion 3, that nociception activates physiological responses related 
to stress, for example including changes to heart rate, respiration or hormone levels. While 
C. elegans does not have a specific respiratory or circulatory system, it does show a range of 
physiological stress responses to noxious stimuli, including noxiously high temperatures and 
toxic heavy metals. These responses include changes to signaling systems essential for food 
storage and growth, and may involve hormonal signaling via sterols (Gerisch et al., 2001; 
Rodriguez et al., 2013; Zhou et al., 2011). So, while C. elegans has rather different 
physiological stress responses compared to mammals, they are activated by nociception.  
 
Evidence that the behaviour is not due to nociception alone (Criterion 4) is a prerequisite for 
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any valid indicator, and does not suggest a specific variable to be measured. 
 
Things are a little more promising for long-term avoidance behaviour (Criterion 5). Avoiding 
noxious stimuli, particularly in the long term, seems indicative of learning and flexible 
behaviour. However, the behaviour of C. elegans again provides a useful contrast case. 
Amano and Maruyama (2011) showed that these nematodes also do avoidance learning. 
Here, nematodes learned to avoid an olfactory cue that had been paired with noxious acidic 
environments. These learned associations can drive avoidance behaviour for up to 24 hours: 
this is fairly impressive for an organism that typically lives for 2-3 weeks (see also Sasakura & 
Mori, 2013, for a review of learning and memory in C. elegans). Long-term avoidance 
learning in response to nociceptive stimuli therefore occurs in C. elegans, plausibly without 
pain experiences.  
 
However, avoidance behaviour that displays more flexibility in learning and motor 
responses may be more likely to index pain experiences. For example, Dunlop et al. (2006) 
showed that goldfish learned different strengths of avoidance behaviour to different levels 
of electric shocks that were given in different spatial areas of a tank, and retained this 
information for at least 24 hours. It is important to identify exactly what about this is 
distinctive. As emphasized in Dunlop et al. (2006), goldfish show evidence of spatial memory 
in response to nociceptive stimuli. Goldfish learn to avoid specific locations that they 
associate with aversive stimuli. In the example above C. elegans does not do this; it instead 
simply moves from higher to lower concentrations of the olfactory cue, which does not 
require having any spatial representation of the environment.  
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Of relevance here, Barron and Klein (2016) have argued that having an egocentric spatial 
model of the environment is key to having a capacity for consciousness. They follow 
(Merker, 2005, 2007) in arguing that consciousness is supported by an internal integrated 
model of the organism, their needs, and the external environment. This system regulates 
decision making in relation to the priority of different needs, and the lay-out and resources 
available in the external environment. If this is a plausible model of consciousness, then this 
provides the reason for thinking that goldfish are conscious, and can have pain experiences, 
but C. elegans does not. Goldfish are capable of spatial memory and learning, an indicator of 
consciousness in general, while C. elegans does not. In this case a better criterion for 
identifying pain experiences is that an organism shows that they are capable of learning 
about noxious stimuli in a way that reflects features that are general indicators of 
consciousness, for example via spatial learning and memory. 
 
Next up is Criterion 6: that the organism exhibits protective behaviour, including “wound 
guarding, limping, rubbing or licking” (see Table 1, Sneddon et al. 2014). This again looks 
promising, but needs unpacking. First is the observation made in Rose et al. (2014) that 
some of these behaviours are not clearly protective: a trout whose lips have been injected 
with acid is not protecting an injury by rubbing their lips on the side of a tank. It could be an 
attempt to dull pain sensations by ‘confusing’ the receptors in the injured area, or it could 
be a reflex-like response to rub off a noxious substance: it is not clear how this behaviour 
should be interpreted. Wound guarding and limping, or generally not using an affected body 
part, seems more like it. These behaviours suggest that the organism’s behaviour is being 
driven by ongoing pain sensations. However, again, there are other possible plausible 
explanations. As reviewed above, one of the properties of nociceptors is that with repeated 
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or prolonged stimulation, or at sites of injury or inflammation, their sensitivity dramatically 
increases. Nociceptive responses (e.g. withdrawal behaviours) are now produced for very 
low intensity stimulation of injured areas. In organisms capable of simple avoidance 
learning, this also means that nociception can itself drive organisms to ‘protect’ injured 
areas, potentially by learning to hold body parts in particular positions to avoid further 
stimulation, or avoiding using injured body parts for moving or grooming. 
 
This criterion is therefore, I think, particularly hard to evaluate. Presumably there is some 
difference between the guarding behaviours related to purely nociceptive processing and 
those related to pain experiences, but pulling these apart is not straightforward. To do this, 
referring to more general cognitive abilities associated with consciousness seems like a 
possible move. Protective behaviour based on more complex forms of learning, prediction 
or planning about what sorts of stimuli or activities are likely to trigger strong nociceptive 
responses, and how to avoid them, seem more likely to indicate the presence of pain 
experiences than more local protective responses.  
 
The last criterion on the list of whole animal responses to noxious stimuli (Criterion 7) is that 
all the above are reduced by administered analgesia and local anaesthetics. Here I focus on 
analgesia. Morphine and other opiate-based analgesics act on nociceptive pathways, so if 
these pathways feed into mechanisms of pain experiences, then they also act on pain. 
However, where nociceptive pathways do not feed into mechanisms of pain experiences, 
one would still expect morphine to affect purely nociceptive responses, as they do in C. 
elegans. For sensitivity to these kind of analgesics to be a valid indicator of pain experiences, 
one therefore needs to show that these analgesics affect behaviours that really are valid 
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indicators of pain experiences.  
 
However, the structure of this criterion leads to a problem. The idea is that if one has found 
valid indicators of pain experiences, the behaviours associated with these criteria (i.e. the 
behaviours that organisms exhibit when they have pain experiences) should be reduced 
when the organism if given analgesics. The problem is that put like this, it is not very clear 
what behavioural sensitivity to administered analgesics adds in evidential terms. For this 
criterion to work, it requires that researchers have already identified a set of valid 
behavioural indicators of pain experiences. 
 
There is another twist. This is that if an organism is capable of having pain experiences, but 
its pain responses were not sensitive to (standard) analgesics, this would be very surprising 
indeed. Analgesics typically target nociceptive pathways, and there is typically a strong 
association between the modulation of nociceptive processing and the modulation of pain 
experiences and associated pain responses. So, where an analgesic successfully modulates 
nociceptive processing, it would typically also modulate pain experiences. The twist is that 
organisms with nociceptive systems tend to have (as far as I can tell, always have) in-built 
antinociceptive systems. Endogenous antinociceptive systems inhibit or otherwise disrupt 
nociceptive processing when it is profitable to the organism to do so: they produce what are 
effectively analgesics. For example, in C. elegans, an antinociceptive opioid system 
modulates nociception when there is both noxious stimuli and food present: by inhibiting 
nociceptive processing, standard nociceptive responses (like withdrawal reflexes) are 
triggered less often, making the organism able to access food while noxious stimuli are 
present (Mills et al., 2016).  
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Most (plausibly all) organisms capable of pain experiences are capable of producing 
effective analgesics through antinociception. Where pain experiences are present then, 
their being sensitive to at least some analgesics is incredibly likely, given the background 
biology of antinociception. It follows from this that showing that pain responses are 
sensitive to analgesics is, yet again, of little evidential value: indeed this is entirely to be 
expected. So, while, on the face of it this looks like a fairly persuasive criterion for 
identifying the capacity for pain experiences, behavioural sensitivity to administered 
analgesics fails to do much work by itself.  
 
In summary, many of the criteria associated with the first principle fail to be valid indicators 
of pain experiences, at least in creatures whose capacity for pain experiences is in doubt. 
The criterion of central processing of nociception, relating to fear and learning (Criterion 1), 
either assumes too much (that the animal is indeed conscious, and capable of having 
valenced conscious states), or interpreted in a less demanding way, is not a valid indicator. 
Nociception is processed ‘centrally’ in C. elegans, and supports avoidance learning. 
Nociception in C. elegans is also sensitive to endogenous modulators, and activates 
physiological stress responses (Criteria 2 and 3). Criterion 4 is a prerequisite for any valid 
indicator, and does not suggest a specific variable to be measured. C. elegans also shows 
long-term avoidance behaviour (Criteria 5). However, avoidance behaviour in other genera 
may be tied to abilities related to consciousness in general, like spatial learning, or perhaps 
more complex forms of associative learning. Protective behaviours (Criterion 6) are, I think, 
hard to make a call on: some are not very obviously related to pain experiences and could 
be generated by nociception alone, but some types of protective behaviours, again related 
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to capacities related to consciousness in general, may be valid indicators. Behavioural 
sensitivity to analgesia (Criterion 7) was argued to be of little evidential value: this is almost 
guaranteed in animals that exhibit valid behavioural indicators for pain, on basic biological 
grounds.  
 
4.2 Criteria related to the second key principle: Animal shows a change in motivation 
 
The second principle expresses the idea that pain plays a role in learning and both short and 
long-term decision making relating to noxious stimuli. As such, some of the features related 
to this principle have already been covered in the discussion above. These include (from 
Criterion 11) that animals are capable of conditioned place avoidance (avoiding locations 
associated with noxious stimuli: possibly a valid indicator) and long-lasting avoidance 
learning more generally (not a valid indicator). 
 
The first criterion to be considered for this second key principle is self-administration of 
analgesia (Criterion 8 from Table 1). This criterion (and others like it below) relates to 
behaviour in situations where analgesics are available to the animal, such that they can 
choose to access them, but are not directly administered. That is, it relates to learning and 
decision making. In species that continue to eat and drink while in potentially painful 
situations (e.g. chickens) there is evidence that following ‘conditioning’ for periods of being 
fed either only regular food or only food containing analgesics (these are colour coded), 
injured animals subsequently prefer foods that contain analgesics (Danbury et al., 2000). 
This is deemed to be evidence of the presence of pain experiences: animals undergoing 
continual pain experiences regulate their behaviour so that they can access pain relief, via 
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previously learned associations between specific types of food, locations or other cues, and 
pain relief. This needs some unpacking.  
 
First, it is somewhat ambiguous in the original article (Danbury et al., 2000) whether the aim 
is to show that chickens are capable of having pain experiences at all, or whether, given that 
they can, that lameness in particular (common in chicken farming) causes pain and so 
demands action in animal welfare terms. This is important. As reviewed above, if the study 
is based on the premise that chickens are capable of pain experiences, then behaviours 
driven by nociceptive processing alone could be used as reliable indicators of pain. This is 
based on the further assumption that particular levels of nociceptive processing usually also 
cause pain experiences. In this case, transferring the same experimental paradigms to other 
genera requires further argument to show that the behavioural responses really are unique 
to pain experiences. 
 
This argument might work as follows. Through learning these animals associate one colour 
coded food with lower levels of felt pain, and so they prefer eating it over food that contains 
no analgesics. Food preferences are the result of reward learning: injured animals have a 
learned association between analgesic laden food and a reward (less pain), and this guides 
their eating behaviour. The question is whether one should expect reward learning of this 
kind to work only where pain experiences are present, or whether similar reward learning 
would be expected where only nociception is present. For example, a downwards 
modulation of nociceptive processing may count as a reward in the central nervous system, 
whatever its source, and whether conscious experiences are present or not. And as above, 
sensitivity to analgesics, and the ability to do avoidance learning concerning nociceptive 
 23 
activity, do not in themselves reliably indicate the presence of pain experiences. In this case, 
and in the absence of any straightforwardly parallel studies in C. elegans (as far as I know), 
claiming that this is a valid indicator of pain experiences is unclear, and needs more 
theoretical defense. 
 
Next to be considered here, Sneddon et al. (2014) suggest that relief learning (Criterion 12) 
is a valid indicator of pain experiences. In relief learning organisms learn to prefer stimuli 
associated with the sudden absence of a (previously present) potentially painful stimuli. One 
interpretation of this is that it may signify a preference for ‘relief’ from the painful stimulus. 
Sneddon et al. (2014) argues that as relief learning requires “considerably higher 
processing” than reflex actions or nociception, it may signify the presence of pain 
experiences (p. 205). 
 
Whether relief learning requires “considerably higher processing” than simple, non-
conscious forms of learning is in fact not entirely clear. Relief learning is a form of 
backwards conditioning on noxious stimuli. In more standard forward conditioning 
paradigms, the conditioned stimulus (CS) (e.g. an odor) is presented before the 
unconditioned stimulus (US) (e.g. electric shock), and organisms learn to avoid the CS via its 
association with the US. In backward conditioning, the order is reversed: here the US (e.g. 
shock) is presented before the CS (e.g. odor). In relief learning in particular, organisms learn 
to now approach the CS.  
 
Backwards conditioning is however somewhat messy: in a range of organisms, backwards 
conditioning sometimes leads to ‘relief’ learning, where the organism learns to approach 
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the CS, but it also sometimes results in the same response as forward conditioning, where 
the organism learns to avoid the CS (e.g. see reviews across genera in Andreatta et al., 2010; 
Felsenberg et al., 2014; Gerber et al., 2014; Green et al., 2019). Which response is more 
prevalent depends on a range of experimental factors. There has, to my knowledge, been 
little work on backwards conditioning in C. elegans, though work so far has not found 
evidence of relief learning (Amano & Maruyama, 2011). 
 
On the one hand then, relief learning may just be a form of simple associative learning, 
different in some ways to regular forward conditioning, but perhaps not substantially so. C. 
elegans is perfectly capable of forward conditioning with aversive stimuli, so perhaps more 
experimentation would find evidence of relief learning in this organism too. In this case, 
relief learning is unlikely to be a valid indicator of pain experiences. 
 
On the other hand, relief learning may be a form of associative learning that is only possible 
in creatures that are capable of consciousness. Trace conditioning, for example, where 
animals learn to associate two stimuli presented across a time interval, has been argued to 
be a form of learning that is unique to conscious organisms (Birch, 2020). Trace conditioning 
requires some sustained ‘memory’ of the first stimulus, perhaps indicative of (conscious) 
working memory. Similarly, relief learning is perhaps conceptually more complex than 
standard forward conditioning. Instead of associating an aversive stimulus with the 
presence of a neutral cue, here the association is between a cue and the offset of an 
aversive stimulus. As such, this may require some sort of tracking of temporal relationships 
that goes beyond that required in forward conditioning. If the ability to track and predict 
features of the external environment based on distinctly spatial and temporal features is 
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key to consciousness in general, then perhaps relief learning can only be done in animals 
that are capable of consciousness. In this case of course, relief learning would be a valid 
indicator of pain experiences, through its relation to more general features of 
consciousness. 
 
Relief learning is still a fairly new research area, so more information on the neural 
mechanisms that supports it would be helpful in determining which option is more likely. 
One interesting line of evidence from neural and molecular research on relief learning in 
fruit flies (as reviewed in Gerber et al., 2014) suggests that the mechanisms regulating 
forward conditioning and relief learning are not radically different: they may use the same 
network of cells, but be the product of different dynamics of molecular signaling. Whether 
this difference is likely to track other differences between conscious and non-conscious 
organisms is an open question (though, on the face of it, seems unlikely). In this case, more 
empirical work on relief learning, and stronger theoretical arguments linking relief learning 
to consciousness are required before it can be seen as a valid indicator of pain experiences. 
 
A criterion of pain experience that is often recognized to be of obvious validity is that 
animals show evidence of trade-offs in motivational requirements surrounding aversive 
stimuli. For brevity, I here include the related criteria of paying a cost to avoid noxious 
stimuli and paying a cost to access analgesia: all of these are essentially about trade-offs 
(this combines Criteria 9, 13 and 14). Examples of these trade-offs include trout trading 
between being near conspecifics and avoiding electric shocks (Dunlop et al., 2006), goldfish 
trading between accessing food and avoiding electric shocks (Millsopp & Laming, 2008), 
zebrafish trading off being in a barren (aversive) tank against accessing analgesics present in 
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the water (Sneddon, 2013), and hermit crabs trading off electric shocks in accordance with 
the ‘value’ of their shell (Appel & Elwood, 2009; Elwood & Appel, 2009).  
 
Again, C. elegans is a party pooper, at least on straightforward readings of this criterion. The 
nematode shows trade off behaviour between the ‘bad’ of crossing a strip of aversive 
copper ions to the ‘good’ of approaching an attractive odour, depending on the 
concentration of both the aversive and attractive stimuli (Shinkai et al., 2011; see also Mills 
et al., 2016 reviewed above on antinociception). The nematode does this using very simple 
mechanisms of sensory integration across a handful of neurons. In a sense, this is hardly 
surprising behaviour: any organism that has different needs is going to need some system 
for deciding what to prioritise. So, it cannot be the mere existence of trade-offs in needs 
that does the work: the trade-offs need to be of a certain kind. Again, the general properties 
associated with consciousness are key: that decision making is based on a range of 
integrated information and that learning is flexible and long-lasting. These properties are 
not found to a great degree in the behaviour of C. elegans, but they might be in some of the 
other examples mentioned above.  
 
Take the first case above. Here, trout were subject to the same experimental set up as the 
goldfish described in Section 4.1: electric shocks were delivered in particular spatial areas of 
a tank, which the fish learned to avoid (though the trout did not hold onto this information 
for long) (Dunlop et al., 2006). When presented with a conspecific next to the areas where 
shocks were present, trout (a shoaling fish) often remained in these areas, and so endured 
electric shocks while choosing to be close to a conspecific. As argued in the paper, this 
shows that pain avoidance in these species “is not purely a reflex action…If a fish was willing 
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to change this supposedly inelastic, stereotypical response to a noxious stimulus, it is highly 
probable that pain perception can occur in fish” (p. 269, op cit). Using a similar paradigm, 
Millsopp and Laming (2008) showed that goldfish trade off between the motivation to avoid 
different intensities of electric shocks and the motivation to eat. These authors are rather 
less convinced that this provides evidence of fish pain experiences, but note that “If a fish is 
willing to change this reflex response to a noxious stimulus, as shown here, it is possible that 
there is some sort of conscious decision making taking place” (p. 253).   
 
One key assumption here is that actions that are not ‘pure’ or inelastic reflexes provide 
evidence of pain experiences, because elasticity in decision making requires conscious 
decision making. Rose and colleagues have heavily criticised this assumption over a number 
of publications (Rose, 2002, 2007; Rose et al., 2014) on the grounds that elastic behaviours 
can be performed (and often are) without awareness. The C. elegans example also shows 
that the assumption is straightforwardly false. Very simple neural mechanisms are capable 
of guiding actions in an elastic way in response to different concentrations of aversive and 
attractive stimuli. This is parallel to different intensities of electric shock and different levels 
of hunger in goldfish.  
 
This is where the general properties associated with consciousness come back in. 
Pretheoretically, it seems plausible to assume that some kinds of decision making can only 
be done if the neural machinery of consciousness is in place, for example when it involves a 
reasonable degree of integration and comparison of multiple sources of information. 
Clearly, C. elegans can do decision making that requires some integration and comparison, 
but it can’t do much. Identifying if there are qualitative differences between the abilities of 
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C. elegans and goldfish in this regard would be telling. One possibility comes back to the 
ability of goldfish (and a lesser degree trout), but not C. elegans, to direct trade-off 
behaviour informed by spatial learning and memory. In this case, it is not the presence of 
trade-off behaviour per se that does the work, it is the evidence of having an integrated and 
spatial internal model of the environment, ‘tagged’ with the locations of aversive and 
attractive stimuli, that guides behaviour.  
 
There is more to say too about the case of trade-off behaviour in hermit crabs. In Elwood 
and Appel (2009) hermit crabs given electric shocks via their shells were more likely to move 
into a new shell when one was presented 20s later, and those in low-value shells were 
particularly likely to move. Appel and Elwood (2009) found that shocked crabs were more 
likely to move into a new shell up to 1 day after the shocks. The authors discuss this in terms 
of forming a memory of the painful event that informed later behaviour. In many ways 
though, this behaviour is very similar to simple but long-lasting associative avoidance 
learning and trade-off behaviour found in C. elegans. The difference here is that the aversive 
and attractive stimuli (noxious stimulation and high quality shelter) are linked to specific 
shells. Given that having a high quality shell is clearly a significant motivator for hermit crabs 
in general (as reviewed in both papers), this behaviour may not be so surprising. In addition, 
the ‘memory’ of the painful event may simply consist of unconscious associative memory, 
rather than anything episodic, as is somewhat implied in the author’s original discussion. 
 
Later though, Magee and Elwood (2016) suggested that these findings may be an 
experimental artifact from where the electrical wires were positioned in the high and low 
value shells (the shocks in ‘low value’ shells may have effectively been higher than in ‘high 
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value’ shells). They developed an alternative paradigm that also shows trade-off behaviour, 
now between electric shock and predator avoidance. Here, hermit crabs were housed in the 
same shell types, and shocked when a variety of odours were present in the tank. Hermit 
crabs shocked when odours from predators were present were less likely than others to exit 
their shells. Again, this trade-off may or may not reflect the presence of pain experiences: it 
may be a simpler non-conscious decision based on the relative degrees of aversion to these 
two stimuli. 
 
Instead, other behaviours discussed in these papers seems (to me) far more convincing of 
consciousness and the capacity for pain experiences in hermit crabs. When choosing new 
shells, hermit crabs perform complex and multi-sensory investigations of shells to identify 
one of adequate size, shape, strength and weight, and that is better than their current shell. 
They combine visual information with information gained from investigation of the external 
surfaces and inside of the shell with their legs and chelipeds (claws), and retain this 
information for up to 40 minutes. This behaviour displays far more complex abilities relating 
to integration and comparison of information than in the mere existence of trade-off 
behaviour between two aversive states. If the findings of Appelwood and Elwood (2009) are 
not in fact experimental artefacts, and if trade-off behaviour relating to shell choice is based 
these integrative decision making abilities, it is these abilities that makes it plausible that 
hermit crabs have pain experiences.  
 
Further, Magee and Elwood (2016) report on other interesting effects. Hermit crabs 
shocked in high intensity odours of mussels (a prey food) are less likely to exit their shells, 
perhaps (according to the authors) because areas where mussels are concentrated are more 
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likely to have predators. Some hermit crabs exited their shell and then proceeded to 
investigate the inside of it. The crabs that exited their shells and moved far away were 
heavier than other crabs: the authors suggest that heavier crabs are more able to forcibly 
take shells from others, so exiting their shells entirely may be less risky. This again suggests 
rather more complex decision making than in the simple trade-off case: hermit crabs here 
may not merely be trading off between two valenced states, but a much broader range of 
states and factors. These potentially include various aspects of shell quality, predator threat 
assessed from a variety of stimuli, own size and general health, and perhaps more. This is a 
rather more complex matrix of information that needs to be integrated and compared, and 
plausibly goes well beyond what can be achieved by the machinery that C. elegans relies on. 
It is this ability to do complex decision making, based on a wide range multi-modal 
information, that plausibly does the work of showing that hermit crabs are conscious and 
capable of pain experiences, rather than the existence of simple trade-offs in relation to 
aversive stimuli.  
 
The final criterion to be examined here is that organisms exposed to noxious stimuli 
selectively attend to their ‘painful’ state, rather than any other usually salient stimuli 
(Criterion 10). Here, I assume that paying attention to the wound site via protective 
behaviours (grooming etc) is covered by that criterion as discussed above. This criterion is 
more related to whether, when injured, organisms are less responsive to external stimuli 
that usually elicit specific responses (e.g. to new objects, predators). For example, Ashley et 
al. (2009) showed that rainbow trout treated with noxious stimuli (acid injected into lips) 
show a large drop in antipredator responses compared to control groups. This suggests that 
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nociceptive stimulation changes the attentional focus of the injured organism, indicating 
that they have pain experiences. 
 
There is a complication here though. There is evidence from many genera, including in bony 
fish, that predator threats (among other cues) stimulate antinociceptive responses in the 
brainstem (as reviewed in Alves et al., 2013). As described earlier, these responses 
effectively block nociceptive processing and responses, and so allow other context-
appropriate behaviours to be produced, such as anti-predator responses. In this case, one 
would not usually expect a huge drop in antipredator responses in injured fish: 
antinociception works exactly to preserve antipredator behaviour. In this case, it is not 
entirely clear what was found in (Ashley et al., 2009). Perhaps these fish were noxiously 
stimulated to such an extent that standard antinociception responses were not triggered, or 
only had a minimal effect on behaviour, but this is not explicitly claimed in the paper. 
Further, this shows that the criterion needs modification: perhaps one should not expect 
significant changes in behaviour regarding highly salient stimuli in animals given noxious 
stimulation, but only changes regarding less salient stimuli that less directly related to 
survival, and so where it is less likely that there are reliable and specific antinociceptive 
responses.  
 
It is still though slightly unclear exactly what this criterion is getting at. One possibility is that 
this criterion is arguably another version of the criterion relating to trade-offs: animals trade 
off between responding to salient stimuli in typical ways (often related to survival), and 
avoiding the possibility of further noxious stimulation or exacerbating existing injuries. As 
above, this trade off is likely related to the degree of existing injury or level of nociceptive 
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activity. In this case though, the same comments about trade-offs can be made here. More 
persuasive evidence of pain experiences would need to show that trade-offs are made on 
the basis on the integration and comparison of multiple factors. 
 
In sum, many of the criteria relating to the second principle do not provide obviously valid 
indicators of pain experiences either (again, at least in creatures whose capacity for pain is 
in doubt). Criterion 11 was covered in the discussion in Section 4.1. The ability to self-
administer analgesia based on reward learning needs more theoretical defence, as does 
relief learning (Criteria 8 and 12). The remaining criteria (Criteria 9, 10, 13, and 14) have 
been argued to be variations on the general theme of being able to make trade-offs 
between different motivational states, sometimes relying on prior associative learning. 
Trade-offs relating to noxious stimulation are shown in C. elegans, as is associative learning. 
Instead, more complex trade-offs in decision making, based on the integration and 
comparison of multiple factors and stimuli are better able to differentiate between 
behaviours based on nociception and pain experiences. Again, these bring us back to 
abilities related to consciousness in general, rather than any specific to pain. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
I have used a very basic interventionist approach to experimentation and the contrast case 
of C. elegans to show that many of the behavioural indicators used to identify pain 
experiences in controversial genera are unlikely to be valid in their current form. A summary 
of the analysis of these is in Table 2 below. As suggested throughout, the idea here is not to 
radically undermine claims about pain experiences in the more controversial genera. The 
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aim was instead to describe, where possible, behavioural indicators that are more likely to 
be robust, using the general strategy of allying them to general features of learning and 
decision making associated with consciousness. Indeed, a fair amount of the current 
literature can I think be reinterpreted according to more valid indicators of pain 
experiences, and still support the claim that these genera are capable of pain experiences. 
 
Principle: Whole-animal responses to 
potentially painful events differ from 
innocuous stimulation 
Valid 
indicator? 
Principle: Change in motivational 
behaviours after a potentially painful 
event 
Valid 
indicator? 
Criteria: 
1. Possession of nociceptors, evidence 
of central processing of nociception 
involving areas that regulate motivated 
behaviour (including learning and fear) 
2. Nociceptive action responsive to 
endogenous modulators 
3. Nociception activates physiological 
responses linked to stress (e.g. changes 
in respiration, heart rate or hormonal 
levels) 
4. Evidence that responses are not just 
a nociceptive withdrawal reflex 
5. Long-term avoidance behaviour 
6. Protective behaviours such as wound 
guarding, limping, rubbing, licking or 
excessive grooming 
 
No 
 
 
 
No 
 
No 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
Depends 
Unclear 
 
 
Criteria: 
8. Self-administration of analgesia 
9. Pay a cost to access analgesia 
10. Pay selective attention to response 
to the noxious stimulus over other 
normally salient stimuli; animal does 
not respond appropriately to 
competing events 
11. Conditioned place avoidance  
12. Relief learning 
13. Trade-offs between avoiding 
noxious stimuli and other motivational 
requirements  
14. Evidence of paying a cost to avoid 
the noxious stimulus 
 
 
Unclear 
Depends 
Depends 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
Unclear 
Depends 
 
 
Depends 
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7. All of the above reduced by analgesia 
or local anaesthetics 
No 
additional 
value 
 
 
Table 2. ‘Unclear’ refers to the need for further empirical work and theoretical defense of this 
criterion. ‘Depends’ refers to whether or not the criterion refers to general features of learning and 
decision making associated with consciousness. Where it does, it is likely to be valid indicator. 
Where it does not, it is unlikely to be valid. 
 
This analysis also sheds some light on the strategy used in animal pain research that often 
seems to trade on the idea that indicators, evidence and conclusions about pain experiences 
can be somehow made independently of indicators, evidence and conclusions about 
consciousness more generally (the words ‘conscious’ and ‘consciousness’ are not mentioned 
anywhere in Sneddon et al. 2014). This contrasts with views from critics who sometimes 
claim that in order to show that an organism is capable of pain experiences, one must ‘first’ 
show that they are conscious at all. For example Rose et al. (2014) claim that: “It is 
considered axiomatic that pain depends on consciousness, so a demonstration that fishes 
can feel pain depends on showing that they are also conscious” (p. 118). This is intended to 
be an off-putting requirement, and it is sometimes explicitly claimed (by both sides) that it is 
impossible to ‘prove’ the presence of consciousness in any non-human animal (e.g. as 
reviewed in Elwood, 2019).  
 
Whether or not this is simply a conservative dialectical move, it is peculiar on several fronts. 
First, if an animal can (consciously) experience pain, they are by definition capable of being 
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conscious. Evidence that an animal is capable of feeling pain is therefore evidence that the 
animal is capable of consciousness. If one has valid markers of pain experiences, one need 
not ‘also’ or ‘first’ show that the organism is conscious at all. Similarly, a capacity for 
consciousness of at least some kind is a requirement for a capacity for pain experiences. In 
this case, valid indicators of pain experiences cannot help but track the capacities and 
responses associated with consciousness in general. That is, research on pain experiences is 
research on consciousness. This fits neatly with the analysis above: researchers arguably 
already work with an implicit set of theoretical assumptions about what sorts of evidence 
are relevant to pain experiences, and where successful, these tend to track the theoretical 
assumptions made about consciousness in general.  
 
More broadly, talking about consciousness does not commit one to making radically 
unsubstantiated claims of the sort not generally tolerated in science. Claims about pain 
experiences, or animal consciousness more generally, are like any other, and are generally 
treated as such by critics. Where arguments are made against claims of animal pain 
experiences, for example by positing plausible alternative explanations based on 
nociception, critics are staking a position about the truth value of these claims, or at the 
least stating what would need to be known or tested experimentally in order to assess them 
properly. That is, both proponents and critics do actually think there is a fact of the matter, 
and that empirical research can help us figure out what it is. This is very different from 
claiming that is scientifically impossible to ever know the truth value of claims about animal 
pain and animal consciousness.  
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On this basis, and given the analysis provided throughout the paper, I propose that the best 
way to make progress on questions around animal pain is to clearly ally them with questions 
of animal consciousness more generally, and to productively use conceptual and empirical 
work in both areas to develop more theoretically defensible criteria and experimental 
procedures. Most of the work in substantiating claims about animal pain is done in the 
theoretical arena, and it is where critics attack, often very reasonably so. This is not to say 
that existing claims about pain in controversial genera are likely to be wrong: above I 
outlined evidence not specific to pain that I think is already fairly persuasive. I also outlined 
which general capacities associated with consciousness seem more likely to do the work in 
providing persuasive evidence of pain experiences. These include spatial learning and 
memory, complex forms of associative learning, and complex trade-offs in decision making. 
Developing valid indicators based on these, and being explicit about the theoretical 
reasoning behind them, would be a productive way of moving forwards in this literature. 
 
A final note: of course, this strategy might not work. It might well prove impossible to come 
to a general consensus on the capacities associated with consciousness (see e.g. Irvine, 
2012, 2017 for a skeptical view on human visual consciousness science). In this case, other 
strategies will have to be used (see e.g. Shevlin, this volume, for an alternative). My hunch 
though is that similar issues around consensus building are likely to arise to any attempt to 
separate off sets of privileged capacities that are used to motivate ethical arguments about 
animal welfare. In that case, analyzing the capacities associated with consciousness seems 
like a reasonable place to start. 
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